Being-in-the-world is meaning-in-the-world

(…thinking, however abstract, origins in an embodied subjectivity, at once overdetermined and permeable to contingent events (…).)

Teresa De Lauretis, 2004

- A prominent avenue within research on the relevance of sensory-motor information (keyboard and mouse, 3D simulation, etc.) and the experiential context of their process of perception—has been opened in the corpus of the field of embodied cognition, incremental and enactive cognition (De Jaegher et al., 2010), which challenged the assumption that nervous systems evolved for abstract thought (in terms of more thoroughgoing interactionist perspective). The adaptive control of action (De Jaegher et al., 2010) is, therefore, contextualized (in terms of experiential foundation specific to the sensory-motor system). However, De Jaegher et al. point out, research insight is still intertwined with methodological strictures: sensory-motor interactionist at its best, and I would agree that, at the worst, it usually remains at the level of object-oriented ontologies. The central issue with the purely symbolic perspective has thus not been resolved through the embodied turn.

- Social cognition demands the exploration of concepts like intersubjectivity and subiectivity, which have been held in distance from the possibility of being analyzed in an interactive way and primarily regarded as a merely contextual resource for individual mechanisms. Indeed, Lévi-Strauss has expressed that “summer is the importance of second person, participatory capabilities.” They have been as far as claims that, therefore, as the goal of neuroscience research questions is to explain some behavior, be it a phenomenon from vision, communication, motor control, navigation, language, memory, or decision making, the behavioral research must be considered, for the most part, epistemologically poor.

Contingent Cognitive Constellations

(…) the role of interactive and individual elements in social cognition must be systematically re-evaluated (…)

(…) social cognition may occur in the absence of interaction.

De Jaegher et al. (2010)

- To probe the access to others’ intentions requires escaping an essentialist and universalism model of theory of mind. Linguists hold that a child cannot proficiently learn to speak without this capacity (Goldin-Meadow and Nihira, 2012). (…) suggests that knowing this “perspectivalness” directly enhances the ability to take the second-person perspective, which would essentially allow for epistemic replication to take place. (…) Perhaps most fundamentally, it acknowledges the central problem of imagining another mind’s subjective experience the actual capacity for proper integration of contextual information.

- The epistemic question of how knowledge is being generated and how this is influencing the research results thus arises. (…) improve a historic approach to improve into the practice by further strengthening the way we examine the relation between (object)ive data on changes in brain activity and the engagement of culture and individuals simultaneously. As called neuroanthropology places the brain at the center of discussions about human nature, following that “the nervous system is our most cultural organ.” It emphasizes the interaction between the sociocultural milieu and its contingent sense environment at the material level (i.e., in terms of brain processes). Anthropology has long made the effort to point the exploration of self and Otherness within the scope of the epistemic sciences, however, topics such as the representational aspects of the self and the Other often remain unaddressed through second-person perspective or ethnographic methods yet, but have been limited to be described by the use of questionnaires at the most.

- Within a world of casually, linguistic is commonly referred to affordances (Bateson, 1979) by commenting on their potentiality: “The chair invites us to sit down.” This, they continue, is an emergence of meaning, since the inspection of the aforementioned initiation does not depend on cognitive representations alone but they come into play “through particular actions and projects of the subjective selves of the sentient entities” (Bateson, 1979).

These are central concepts of current robotics, artificial intelligence and information architecture upon which the enactivist method has to shed some light; this possibility needs to be acknowledged for scientific advancement.

Meaning ~ Information

(…) representing is not some kind of register or data structure that we use, but something we do.

Romain Bratte, 2019

- Meaning has been established pervasively as a central concept throughout the disciplines that were involved in the cognitive revolution. The collaboration between psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, computer science, anthropology, and philosophy yielded a new metalevel, wherein these scientific enterprises interested to the point of not noticing its metaphorical nature. To this day, artificial intelligence, digital humanities, and even neurosciences still rely on the symbolic-computational paradigm, which was born under the umbrella of information processing theory. The assumption of this metaphor is that representation is constituted as some form of encoding, that is, as correspondences between mental states of an agent and actual things in the world. By enquiringly restricting research to issues of manipulation and transformation of already constituted carrier of representational content, meaning was replaced with data and thus the fundamental problem of representation ceased to be addressed (i.e., the interactive emergence and function of representational content). So, where does meaning come from?

- This point of view, used as a model in linguistic research, has been widely spread, generating as a by-product its usage as a knowledge model of the human body in a generated fashion (e.g., sensory information considered as input data), regarding enactive development and interaction. Physiology that supports language processing in human beings rests itself to be reduced to the notion of a mere processor; this is a major challenge for the development of artificial intelligence, deep learning and brain-computer interfaces. The general focus of symbolism, in situ, analyses, on the processor in regards to its structure (assuimg-enterprise are alike at an internal level), has disproven the phenomenal content created by the relation of an entity with their rather external counterpart.

- Completely detached and exclusively introspective perspectives have been rendered baryon since the emergence of situated and interactive based theories, such as EC (Nicolai, 2012), particularly regarding sensorimotor coupling with sociocultural contexts, which are saturated with unobserved characteristics of interaction, that need to be accounted for within a mechanism framework (Eisenger et al. 2011).