

The Fair and the Furious: Interpersonal Effects of Moral Anger in Economic Bargaining



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Background

- People's willingness to transfer resources to someone else indicates their concern for another's welfare, emphasizing the role of emotional processes in the pursuit of **fairness**.
- Resource allocation involves a complex process in which **cognitive** and **emotional** processes are intertwined.
- Specifically, in **interpersonal** contexts emotions such as anger, along with analytical thinking strategies, significantly influence decisions in resource allocation.
- It is still unclear whether the **moral anger** influences resource allocation and how cognitive thinking interact with partners' anger responses.

Aims

This study

- explores whether the reason behind a partner's anger (fairness-related or not) influences resource allocations differently in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games
- examines how analytical thinking shapes resource allocation across different conditions in the Dictator and Ultimatum Game.

Hypothesis

We hypothesized that




- Actors would transfer more resources when their partner's anger stemmed from unfairness, especially in the Ultimatum Game.
- Higher analytical thinking was expected to predict greater resource transfers in the Ultimatum Game.
- For actors with lower analytical thinking, the difference in transferred resources between economic games was expected to be smaller.

Methodology

- Participants ($N=224$) were categorized based on their analytical thinking scores (**CRT & BRC**), with those scoring below the median classified as low ($N = 140$) and those above the median classified as high ($N = 84$).
- They were interviewed via **Zoom** and assigned to one of six experimental conditions.
- All participants played the Dictator Game and the Ultimatum Game, allocating a total of 40 Turkish Lira (20 TL per game).

Please write down your decision in the online form sent to you.

GAME 1




Condition 1: Moral Anger (high)
Condition 2: Non-Moral Anger (high)
Condition 3: Unspecified Anger (high)

Condition 4: Moral Anger (low)
Condition 5: Non-Moral Anger (low)
Condition 6: Unspecified Anger (low)

Results

- The MANOVA results showed a significant difference in money transfers between the experimental groups in the DG and UG, Wilks' Lambda = .91, $F(10, 434) = 2.13$, $p = .021$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$.
- Pairwise comparisons revealed that this difference was significant only for participants in the **high moral anger** condition, who transferred significantly more money in the **UG** ($M = 11.13$, $SD = 2.65$) compared to the (high anger) control condition ($M = 8.94$, $SD = 2.57$), $p = .010$, $d = 0.8$.



- No significant differences were found between the groups based on analytical thinking, Wilks' Lambda = .99, $F(2, 221) = 1.04$, $p = .357$, $\eta^2 = .009$.
- Moderation analysis (PROCESS Model 1; Hayes, 2013) showed that analytical thinking did not predict the relationship between experimental conditions and resource allocation either in the DG, $F(3, 220) = 2.054$, $R^2 = .027$, $p = .107$; or in the UG, $F(3, 220) = 1.639$, $R^2 = .022$, $p = .181$.

Conclusion

- Actors transferred more money when their partner's anger stemmed from unfairness. Results may suggest that **empathy**, rather than analytical thinking, could drive prosocial behavior.
- This implies that **interpersonal anger** may trigger prosocial actions by fostering emotional understanding.

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References

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Related Literature:

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Data & Supplementary Material

