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Room: Lecture Hall (C101) Location: Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences

IMPRS NeuroCom Lecture Series "Advanced Statistics"

IMPRS Lecture Series

Dr Melanie Boly | Quantifying consciousness

Guest Lecture
Behavioral reports have traditionally been the gold standard for evaluating the presence of consciousness. However, it is becoming clear that consciousness can be present even in the absence of overt behavior and in unresponsive subjects. I will present neurophysiological evidence supporting the presence of consciousness in dissociated states from several domains. Measures of cortical integration and differentiation have recently proven to be the most reliable marker of consciousness irrespective of behavior and have been validated in a large number of different conditions. The most common dissociation between consciousness and behavior occurs every night during dreaming sleep. Recent work using both within-state, no-task paradigms and TMS-EEG shows that consciousness can be present during non REM sleep when the front of the brain shows high amplitude slow waves, as long as a posterior cortical hot zone is activated. Studies using different anesthetics have also shown that fully unresponsive subjects anesthetized with ketamine (as compared to propofol or xenon) retrospectively report intense dreams, which are again associated with high complexity responses to TMS, despite the occurrence of slow waves. High complexity responses can also be observed in about 20% of patients in a vegetative state suggesting, in line with previous findings using active paradigms, that a number of completely unresponsive patients may retain consciousness. Finally, a number of studies in healthy awake volunteers have emphasized frequent dissociations between consciousness and task-related cognitive functions. Overall, recent findings show that the anatomical neural correlates of consciousness are primarily localized to a posterior cortical hot zone that includes sensory areas, rather than to a fronto-parietal network involved in task monitoring and reporting. I will end by discussing promising avenues of future research. [more]
The search for the structures underlying human cognition, and their corresponding neural substrates, has preoccupied many psychologists and neuroscientists in recent decades. How should scientists best carve up the many dimensions of cognition, emotion, and action into distinct functions or faculties? Do the terms "working memory" and "executive control" reflect the same or different underlying processes? Are there such things as "basic" emotions, and if so, how many? Such questions are difficult to answer but important to ask. Unfortunately, none of them will be directly addressed in this talk. Instead, I will focus on a number of important methodological and conceptual issues surrounding our collective efforts to study the structure of the human mind via brain imaging methods. These include low sensitivity and specificity, poor construct validity, and a lack of isomorphism between constructs at different levels of description. Drawing on a series of recent studies, I demonstrate how large-scale meta-analyses of thousands of published fMRI studies can help us overcome many, but perhaps not all, of these issues. I conclude with a speculative discussion of the short-term and long-term prospects for a fully realized cognitive neuroscience of the human mind. [more]
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